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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations are the product of
a long and tortuous process marked by public controversy and internal
conflict within the United States Sentencing Commission. Although
Congress gave no specific directive to create organizational guidelines,
the Commission concluded that it had authority to adopt them and that
it was desirable to do so.
The Commission's decision to promulgate organizational sentencing
guidelines sparked renewed debate about corporate criminal liability.
t @Copyright 1993 by Kathleen F. Brickey.
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The root question the Commission set out to address was how (and how
much) corporations should be punished.1 That inevitably brought to the
fore the question whether corporations should be punished at all.2 As-
suming continued recognition of corporate criminal liability, what stan-
dard of liability should govern? Is the federal rule, which imposes
liability under modified respondeat superior principles, too broad?3 If so,
how should it be changed? Should all corporations be treated alike, or
should the criminal law recognize distinctions based upon corporate
form or size?4
Established principles governing corporate criminal liability apply in-
discriminately to all corporations, regardless of size or corporate form.
Yet to date, little consideration has been given to the question whether
the reasons supporting recognition of corporate liability for crime apply
with equal force to close corporations.5 Nor has the question whether
the same sentencing rules should apply to close corporations and their
publicly held counterparts been addressed. Hence, this Article journeys
off the beaten path to explore these intersecting themes.
I. Compare Richard S. Gruner, Beyond Fines: Innovative Corporate Sentences Under Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 261 (1993) (supporting innovative sentencing including
restitution, notice to victims, remedial orders, probation, and adverse publicity) with Ilene H. Nagel
& Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development,
Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 222,
227-28 (1993) (Commission determined that optimal penalty approach based on offense loss is un-
workable, and, instead, opted in favor of guideline system favoring incentives and based upon culpa-
bility) and Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules Without...: Some Critical Reflections on the Federal Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 397, 398-99, 408 (1993) (Commission's "carrot and stick"
approach is disastrous; guidelines turn profit making into strict liability offense).
The model the Sentencing Commission adopted creates another subset of compliance issues. See
Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some Practical Considerations in Developing Effective Compliance
Programs A Framework for Meeting the Requirements of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
71 WASH U. L.Q. 375 (1993).
2. Professor Parker concludes they should not. See Parker, supra note 1, at 441.
3. Compare Pamela Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 338-39 (1993) (advocating a more narrowly drawn rule of liability based
upon indicia of corporate culpability) with Leonard Orland, Beyond Organizational Guidelines: To-
ward a Model Federal Corporate Criminal Code, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 361, 366 (1993) (supporting
a modified version of the present federal rule) and Nagel & Swenson, supra note 1, at 238 (indicating
some commentators' discomfiture with the present federal rule).
4. Professor Orland believes that they should be treated alike. See Orland, supra note 3, at
360-61.
5. But see id.
[Vol. 71:189
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II. "MOM AND POP"
Cases through which courts fashioned the rule that corporations could
be liable for crime viewed such liability as a necessary check on corporate
power. In a seminal turn of the century case, the Supreme Court ob-
served that in modem times, corporations conduct "the great majority of
business transactions" 6 and that "interstate commerce is almost entirely
in their hands."7 That being true, to adhere to "the old and exploded"
notion that corporations are incapable of committing crimes "would vir-
tually take away the only means of effectually controlling" them and of
"correcting the abuses" at which the criminal law is aimed.' The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court more recently voiced concern that if
corporations were shielded from criminal liability, they could "inflict
widespread public harm" and leave the public with no prospect of re-
dressing the wrong.9
Both courts undoubtedly had large publicly traded corporations in
mind.1" One can only wonder whether the courts would have been
equally receptive to institutional liability if the prosecutions had been
6. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 496.
Professor Bucy criticizes the Court for making a simplistic choice between only two options-
criminal liability or no liability. Bucy, supra note 3, at 341-42. The Court could, of course, have
considered individual liability and civil remedies. Id. at 340-41.
That courts of this era did not consider civil remedies may be partly attributable to the nature of
the pioneering prosecutions that had led to recognition of corporate criminal liability not long
before. Most were nuisance prosecutions that arose out of a corporation's pollution of a river, failure
to repair deteriorating roads and bridges, or maintenance of a malodorous slaughterhouse. See
Commonwealth v. Hancock Free Bridge Corp., 68 Mass. 58 (1854); State v. Morris Canal & Bank-
ing Co., 22 N.J.L. 537 (1850); President of Susquehannah & Bath Turnpike Rd. Co. v. People, 15
Wend. 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1834); State v. Corporation of Shelbyville, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 112 (1856).
The public at large had no civil cause of action, and individual citizens could sue only if they
suffered an injury different from the harm suffered by the public at large. Thus, these early cases
were, of necessity, criminal prosecutions. State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809, 811 (Ind. 1898); State
v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 370 (1852); People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 539,
543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); State v. Paggett, 36 P. 487, 488 (Wash. 1894). An important purpose of
the prosecution was to abate the nuisance, and the duty to abate was owed to the public. People v.
Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 539, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). See generally Kathleen F. Brickey,
Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393
(1982).
9. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 84 & n.58 (Mass. 1971), cert denied,
407 U.S. 910, and cert denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
10. In Beneficial Finance, for example, three corporations engaged in the business of making
small loans were named defendants. The Beneficial Finance Company was a Delaware holding coin-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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brought against small "mom and pop" corporations. Would the corpo-
rate form of doing business have been relevant to the developing liability
rule? To address this question, it is necessary to consider these contrast-
ing corporate forms and what "corporateness" really means.
Publicly held corporations are owned by many shareholders. Their
ownership and management thus are separate and distinct. Close corpo-
rations, in contrast, are privately owned, and their ownership and man-
agement usually overlap. The term "close corporation" is variously
defined as an organization that has relatively few shareholders, one
whose stock is not widely traded in the securities market,"I or one char-
acterized by substantial identity of ownership and management. 12 The
term "closely held" corporation invariably refers to a privately owned
corporation that has few or relatively few shareholders.13 Regardless of
which term is used, these corporations will have a relatively small
number of shareholders because their stock will not be traded on an ex-
change or in securities markets.
Although recognition of the distinctive nature of close corporations is
largely a twentieth century phenomenon, 14 the importance of this corpo-
rate form cannot be overstated. Today, the vast majority of incorporated
organizations in this country are closely held,"5 and many are small, fam-
ily owned businesses.
Do small, closely held corporations "behave more like individuals than
organizations?" 16 If so, one might posit that in this context the organiza-
pany that was the sole owner of three business trusts. These trusts had 58 small loans offices
throughout Massachusetts. Beneficial Finance also had a wholly owned subsidiary. Id. at 93.
The Household Finance Corporation, also a Delaware corporation, had its national headquarters
in Chicago. Its operations were divided into geographical divisions as well as into departments and
sub-departments. The corporation had 91 loan offices in New England, 40 of them in Massachu-
setts. Id. at 87.
The third corporate defendant was Liberty Loan Corporation, another Delaware company. Lib-
erty owned beneficial shares of several Massachusetts business trusts that engaged in making small
loans. Id. at 60. It also had an office in St. Louis. Id. at 88.
11. Some authorities combine these two concepts and define a close corporation as one that has
relatively few shareholders and whose shares are not widely traded.
12. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (3d
ed. 1992). These close corporation scholars adopt the "not widely traded" definition.
13. Id. § 1.04.
14. Id. § 1.13.
15. Id. § 1.02, at 4-5 & n.1l.
16. Orland, supra note 3, at 361.
[Vol. 71:189
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/1
CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
tional behavior model is inapt 17 and that applying institutional rules of
criminal liability to them thus makes little sense.
The strongest case against imposing criminal liability on close corpora-
tions can be made where complete or substantial overlap exists between
management and ownership. Consider, for example, the corporation
whose records were subpoenaed in Braswell v. United States.18
After conducting his business as a sole proprietorship for fifteen years,
Braswell decided to incorporate. To comply with state corporation law
requirements, he appointed three officer/directors. They were, respec-
tively, Braswell, who served as president; Braswell's wife, who was
named corporate secretary-treasurer; and Braswell's mother, who was
named vice-president. Neither his wife nor his mother had any authority
over the business. Thus, in essence, Braswell continued his sole proprie-
torship, but conducted it in corporate form.
One might argue that in Braswell's setting, imposition of criminal lia-
bility on the corporation would be needlessly redundant. One reason
that corporate criminal liability is recognized is the difficulty of identify-
ing individual wrongdoers within the organization. 19 Many modem cor-
porations are large, complex, highly decentralized organizations with
multiple layers of bureaucracy. These entities depend on a system of del-
egation that diffuses responsibility throughout the organization. In con-
sequence, lower echelon employees "often exercise more responsibility in
the everyday operations of the corporation" than does corporate manage-
17. Id. at 360-61.
Although Professor Orland's articulated concern is the inappropriateness of prosecuting small
closely held corporations, when this Article went to press his proposed Model Federal Corporate
Criminal Code made only large publicly held corporations amenable to prosecution. The proposed
Code defined the term "corporation" to mean an entity that has at least 500 equity shareholders of
record and at least $5 million in assets. Id. at 11 (manuscript, on file with Washington University
Law Quarterly) (drawing upon § 1.31 of the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance (1992)). But see id at 360-61 & n. 20, 365. Thus, his proposal excluded all privately held
corporations, including those that are functionally indistinguishable from their publicly held coun-
terparts. See infra text accompanying notes 26-37.
18. 487 U.S. 99 (1988). The issue the Court considered was whether Braswell, as custodian of
the corporate records, could refuse to produce them on Fifth Amendment grounds. The Court held
he could not. To permit corporate custodians to resist subpoenas on the ground that the corporate
records would personally incriminate them would, in the Court's view, "have a detrimental impact
on the Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most serious problems
confronting law enforcement authorities." Id. at 115.
19. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1972), cerL denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
1993]
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ment.2° Indeed, under the collective knowledge doctrine, there need not
be a single culpable corporate agent.21 Hence, fining the corporation be-
comes an alternative to fining the unidentified or nonexistent wrongdoer.
Even when middle or low-level wrongdoers can be found, there may be
other reasons to hold the corporation accountable. Especially in the con-
text of crimes like antitrust violations, the misconduct may be a response
to institutional pressures-subtle or overt-to maximize profits.22 Con-
sider, for example, a purchasing agent whose profit maximization efforts
result in an unlawful pricing agreement. He agrees to the unlawful ar-
rangement on behalf of the corporation and for its benefit. If the corpo-
rate ethos encourages or tolerates such practices, one might reasonably
regard the core of the problem as institutional. To single out the lowly
employee whose violation occurred in pursuit of the corporate mission
could well be regarded as choosing a convenient scapegoat.
Even if high-level managers consciously seek to foster an environment
that encourages practices that cross the line and give rise to criminal
liability, it is by no means clear that they will bear their share of the
blame. The ease with which wrongdoing can be concealed in an organi-
zational setting is another reason corporate criminal liability is recog-
nized. High-level decisions to risk violating the law will not be recorded
in corporate minutes. They will, instead, be shrouded in secrecy. 23
20. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 83 (Mass. 1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 910, and cert denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
21. Assume that a bank teller with no previous banking experience reports for her first day of
work at a branch of Tenth Bank. A customer comes to her window to make two cash deposits in his
account. The first deposit is $8500. The second is $5000. The teller has never heard of the Cur-
rency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, which requires that a currency transaction report be
filed whenever a deposit or withdrawal of more than $10,000 in cash occurs. The teller's supervisor
knows about the reporting requirement, but does not know that the customer's two deposits must be
aggregated for purposes of the reporting requirement. The bank's general counsel, who works across
town at the bank's main office, knows that the law requires aggregation, but does not, of course,
know that the transaction in question is occurring.
In this scenario, none of the three bank employees has committed a criminal violation of the Act
because none has willfully or knowingly failed to file a report. But if we add up what they know-
the teller's knowledge that two deposits totalling more than $10,000 were made, the supervisor's
general knowledge of the reporting requirement, and counsel's knowledge that multiple deposits
must be aggregated-the requisite knowledge exists. The collective knowledge doctrine permits im-
putation of the three employees' collective knowledge to the bank for purposes of imposing institu-
tional liability. See, eg., United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir.),
cert denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987). Additional cases are collected in 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY,
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILrrY § 4:05 (2d ed. 1992).
22. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1006.
23. Beneficial Finance, 275 N.E.2d at 82.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/1
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Thus, we recognize institutional liability for crime partly because group
action makes it possible to conceal misconduct even at the highest levels
of management.
In the context of Braswell's "one man show," these considerations
may seem less than compelling. Although Braswell enjoys the advan-
tages of doing business in corporate form, the cast of characters is small.
His business has few employees and no bureaucracy. Thus, miscreant
agents will be easier to identify, and opportunities for concealment are
considerably reduced. One might posit, moreover, that in a small organi-
zation like his, the desire for personal gain is more likely to actuate the
wrongdoing.24 Hence, the identified wrongdoer is less likely to be re-
garded as a scapegoat. The organization may, indeed, be his alter ego.
The premise that close corporations act more like individuals than or-
ganizations clearly applies to Braswell's one person corporation. It could
apply with equal force to five or ten person corporations, where a small
group of people work cooperatively toward a common goal. But as the
number of individuals involved in the venture, the complexity of its or-
ganization and operations,25 and the volume of business conducted in its
name all increase, the characteristics that made its behavior analogous to
individual behavior ultimately disappear.
A look at the one thousand largest privately held companies makes the
point.26 Cargill Inc., the largest close corporation in the country, boasts
sales of $42 billion and employs nearly 54,000 workers." United Parcel
Service, the fifth largest, has more than $13.5 billion in sales and more
than 250,000 employees.28
The one hundred largest privately held companies include a litany of
household names-corporate providers of goods like Publix Super Mar-
kets, Montgomery Ward, Bechtel, Phar-Mor, Hallmark Cards, Levi
Strauss, Amway, SC Johnson and Son, Land O'Lakes, Domino's Pizza,
Borg-Warner, Ace Hardware, Estee Lauder, and Dow Corning. They
24. Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice in
the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REv. 247, 278 (1991).
25. E.g., the corporation may have multiple subsidiaries or operating divisions across the coun-
try or world wide.
26. Although most of these companies are corporations, the data base includes privately owned
businesses that are not incorporated as well. See 4 WARD'S BUSINESS DIRECTORY OF U.S. PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC COMPANIES (1993). All of the illustrative examples provided in this article are
corporations.
27. Id. at 1.
28. Id.
19931
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include corporate transportation providers like Trans World Airlines and
Budget Rent a Car as well. All of the companies in this category have at
least $1.5 billion in sales, and half of them employ tens of thousands of
workers.29
The corporate characteristics these organizations display are not lim-
ited to the very largest. The top two hundred privately held companies
include corporations like Barnes and Noble, Del Monte Foods, Mack
Trucks, Maritz, Gulfstream Aerospace, and GAF. Businesses in this
second tier post sales ranging from roughly $900 million to $1.5 billion
and employ up to 45,000 people."0
Levitz Furniture, Seiko of America, Olan Mills, Hartz Mountain,
Goodwill Industries, Bell and Howell, and National Car Rental are cor-
porations among the top 300 privately owned companies.3 1 The volume
of sales in this tier ranges from $640 to $880 million. A majority of these
businesses employ more than 3000 people, and employees of about fifteen
percent of them number in the tens of thousands.
The top 400 include well known corporate entities like Timex, Alamo
Rent A Car, Sverdrup, Franklin Mint, ComputerLand, and Camelot
Music.32 The volume of sales for this tier ranges from $460 to $540 mil-
lion. Most of these businesses have more than 2000 employees, and
nearly thirty percent employ 5000 or more.
Asplundh Tree Expert, Wickes Lumber Company, and the Bose Cor-
poration are among the top 500.31 The volume of sales in this tier ranges
from $400 to $460 million, and most of these companies employ several
thousand employees.3 4
And so it goes down to the thousandth largest privately owned com-
pany, Booth Newspapers Inc. Booth has sales of $450 million and em-
ploys 2700 persons.3a
The contrast between these corporations and Braswell's business is as
stark as that between night and day. Organizations that employ tens of
thousands (or perhaps just thousands) of workers are bound to have lay-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1-2.
31. Id. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 3-4.
33. Id. at 4-5.
34. West Publishing Company, Rand McNally, Formica, Electrolux, and Russell Stover
Candies are among the top 600 close corporations. The volume of sales in this tier ranges from $400
to $450 million, and most employ several thousand people. Id. at 5-6.
35. Id. at 9.
[Vol. 71:189
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ers of bureaucracy characteristic of large publicly held corporations. Far
removed from the one, five, ten, or even thirty person firm, these close
corporations function much like their large, publicly held counterparts.
Indeed, some of these entities have had prior incarnations as publicly
held corporations. During the corporate takeover mania of the 1980s,
the "going private" movement rapidly gained momentum.36 Motivated
by the desire to eliminate the trouble and expense of complying with SEC
regulations, the need to focus on long-term business strategies rather
than quarterly earnings, the determination to avoid hostile takeovers or
the like, many publicly traded companies went private-i.e., were ac-
quired by private investment groups or individuals-and thus became
close corporations. Instead of being owned by millions or tens of
thousands of shareholders, they ordinarily fell into the hands of a single
institutional owner-a partnership, management group, corporate sub-
sidiary or the like.
Corporate giants like RJR Nabisco, Beatrice Foods, Safeway, Borg-
Warner, Southland Corporation, Macy's, Burlington Industries, and Na-
tional Gypsum jumped on the going private band wagon.37 But not all of
them stayed private for long. Once the threat of a hostile takeover dissi-
pated, for example, so might the sole or principal reason for going pri-
vate. Thus, within a few years of going private, some firms like RJR
Nabisco and Safeway went public again.
These changes in corporate form did not transform the affected entities
into smaller, less complex, or less bureaucratic organizations. Just as
Braswell's one man corporation continued to function much like a sole
proprietorship, large companies that went private in the 1980s continued
to behave, for all intents and purposes, like their publicly held counter-
parts. Their management and capital structures remained the same. All
that changed was the shareholder structure-i.e., a change in ownership.
A rule that would subject the RJR Nabiscos and Safeways of the world
to criminal liability before they went private and again after they reestab-
lished public personae-but not in between-would be a startling incon-
gruity. The reasons that support recognition of corporate criminal
liability are wholly unrelated to the question of who owns the corpora-
36. During the 1980s, 565 publicly traded companies went private. These transactions ac-
counted for a little more than 20% of all public takeovers throughout the decade, but in two peak
years equalled 27% of all public takeovers. MERRILL LYNCH, MERGERSTAT REvIEw 1990, 75
(1991).
37. Id. at 77.
19931
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tion. They are tied, instead, to the bureaucracy that makes personal ac-
countability less likely. That bureaucracy will exist in large corporations
whether they are publicly or closely held.
If the rule of institutional liability should treat Braswell and RJR
Nabisco differently, then, it is not because Braswell's corporation is
closely held. It is because the behavior of his small business is analogous
to individual behavior. There are no layers of bureaucracy to penetrate,
and he can monitor his few employees with relative ease-not because he
is the owner, but because he is the manager. Thus, for purposes of craft-
ing an appropriate institutional liability rule, the corporate form in which
he does business has no significance.
Although it is relatively easy to draw gross distinctions between Bras-
well and RJR Nabisco, to craft a rule that quantifies those distinctions
would be a daunting task. A rule that merely selected a minimum
number of managers and/or employees, for example, would likely be ar-
bitrary and oversimplified. One that attempted to detail all of the rele-
vant characteristics that distinguish Braswell and RJR Nabisco, on the
other hand, would likely be overly complex.
But perhaps an intermediate ground can be found by rethinking why
criminal prosecution of Braswell's corporation might be objectionable. Is
it because in this setting it is desirable to promote personal accountabil-
ity? If so, is a corporate fine needed as a proxy for fining the responsible
individual? Is the existence of a penetrable "shield of corporate armor"3
apt to make the prosecutor content to prosecute the corporation, thus
making it less likely that the individual wrongdoer will be held person-
ally accountable? If so, should we encourage or discourage that result?
And if not, what do we gain by giving the government a second bite at
the apple? The answers to these questions should guide the wise discre-
tion of the prosecutor.39
III. A CURIOUS RULE
In tandem with the liability issue is the question whether closely held
corporations should be subject to the same sentencing rules applicable to
their publicly held counterparts. With the exception of a guideline that
authorizes offsetting corporate fines against fines paid by owners of
38. Beneficial Finance, 275 N.E.2d at 83.
39. Cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (leaving the task of deciding
who has a responsible relationship to a violation of the Food and Drug Act to "the good sense of
prosecutors [and] the wise guidance of trial judges").
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closely held corporations, the Sentencing Guidelines do not single out
close corporations for special treatment.4°
The offset guideline grants the court discretion to offset a percentage of
fines imposed on owners who have at least a five percent ownership inter-
est, provided that the owners were fined for the same offense conduct for
which the corporation is to be fined.41 For purposes of this guideline, a
corporation is closely held if it has relatively few owners.42 The size of
the corporation's work force, sales or assets is of no consequence for sen-
tencing purposes.43
The strongest case for offset presents itself in the context of complete
or nearly complete overlap between the fined owner/manager and the
corporation. Suppose, for example, that Braswell is convicted of price
fixing and fined $100,000. His corporation is later convicted and fined
$500,000 for the same offense. Although the corporation is an entity sep-
arate from Braswell, fining the corporation could be viewed as analogous
to fining Braswell himself. As sole owner of the corporation, only he
wields any control over it. Thus, payment of a fine with corporate assets
is payment with assets he owns. To avoid the appearance of "fining him
twice," the corporate fine could be offset by the amount of the fine he
personally paid.'
40. Cf. Orland, supra note 3, at 359 (by ignoring distinctions between large and small corpora-
tions, the Guidelines "treat[] unequals equally," thereby "creat[ing] inequality").
The Guidelines do, however, differentiate corporations on the basis of size for purposes of comput-
ing the culpability score. See UNrrED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL,
§ 8C2.5 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
41. Although an earlier discussion draft of the Guidelines would have required offset, the final
version, § 8C3.4, merely authorizes the court to offset the corporate fine.
§ 8C3.4 Fines Paid by Owners of Closely-Held Organizations
The court may offset the fine imposed upon a closely-held organization when one or more
individuals, each of whom owns at least a 5 percent interest in the organization, has been
fined in a federal criminal proceeding for the same offense conduct for which the organiza-
tion is being sentenced. The amount of such offset shall not exceed the amount resulting
from multiplying the total fines imposed on those individuals by those individuals' total
percentage interest in the organization.
Id. § 803.4.
The offset guideline uses the term "organization" rather than "corporation," presumably for the
sake of consistency. But forms of organization other than corporations have no identity separate and
apart from their members. Thus, in a noncorporate setting, there is nothing against which an indi-
vidual owner's fine might be offset. The "organizational" liabilities of partnerships, proprietorships
and the like are imposed on any and all of the members, jointly and severally.
42. Id. (Application note 1).
43. Id.
44. The guideline applies to fines "imposed" on convicted owners. Should it apply when the
owner/manager has been indemnified? Cf. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1991) (corporation may
19931
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The case would be similar if Braswell and his wife were each fifty per-
cent owners and both had been fined. A subsequent corporate fine would
likewise be satisfied out of assets that, although held in the corporation's
name, they ostensibly own. Hence, the appearance of fining them twice.
It is reasonable to assume that this was the Sentencing Commission's
starting point. The offset guideline proceeds from the premise that
closely held corporations are usually the alter egos of the owners.45 That
being true, "appropriate punishment may be achieved by offsetting the
fine imposed upon the organization by an amount that reflects the per-
centage ownership interest of the sentenced individuals and the magni-
tude of the fines imposed upon those individuals."" Thus, if Mr.
Braswell were the sole owner of the corporation, the corporate fine could
be offset by the entire amount of his $100,000 fine. If the Braswells were
each fifty percent owners, only fifty percent of his fine could be offset.
Reduction of the corporate fine on the basis of Braswell's personal fine
arguably discounts the advantages he derives from doing business in the
corporate form. A corporation is a legal entity that is distinct from its
incorporators and shareholders. Its rights and obligations are treated as
if the corporation were "a separate legal personality."'47
The separateness of the corporation and its owners usually prevents
even a sole shareholder from directly exercising the corporation's
rights.4" Braswell cannot sue in his own name to redress wrongs against
the corporation. Nor can he transfer corporate property in his name.
indemnify agent who acted in good faith, reasonably believed he acted in a manner not inconsistent
with the best interests of the corporation, and had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
unlawful).
If the owner/manager has been indemnified, there is no fairness concern with respect to him if the
corporation is later fined. The corporation has made him whole. Nor does the corporation have a
fairness argument based on its payment of the fine, because it has voluntarily assumed the liability.
The fine was imposed on the individual, not on the corporation.
If fairness to the fined owner is the driving concern behind the offset guideline, should a similar
offset be provided for fined officers and directors who have substantial ownership interests in publicly
held corporations?
45. U.S.S.G., supra note 40, § 8C3.4 (comment. (backg'd.)).
46. Id.
47. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.09.
The law recognizes the concept of corporate separateness in the belief that society benefits from
allowing the incorporator to separate his personal assets from those invested in the corporation.
Separate corporate identity is a privilege designed to promote important objectives like advancing
commerce and industrial growth. Glazer v. Commission on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 431 So. 2d
752 (La. 1983).
48. Separateness may also prevent a shareholder from exercising personal rights. Thus, for
example, an owner/custodian of corporate records like Braswell may not assert the Fifth Amend-
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The cause of action belongs to the corporation and must be brought in its
name. The corporation likewise owns the property, and Braswell must
cause the entity to convey its property in its corporate name.
A principal reason to incorporate (and hence be separate from the or-
ganization) is that corporate shareholders enjoy limited liability. All
they have at risk is whatever capital they choose to invest. If the corpo-
ration breaches a contract with a supplier, the supplier's remedy is
against the corporation, and the corporation alone. If the corporation is
convicted of a crime but lacks sufficient assets to pay the fine, that is the
end of the matter. The government has no claim against the owners in
their individual capacities to pay the corporate fine.49 Simply put,
"[i]nvestors can thus insulate their personal assets from liability arising
out of the corporate enterprise. ' 50
The concept of corporate separateness does not, of course, insulate the
owner/manager from accountability for personal wrongs he commits on
behalf of the corporation. Hence, Braswell's amenability to prosecution
and conviction for price fixing, notwithstanding that he committed the
violation under cloak of his authority as corporate president.5
Although the offset guideline disregards the separateness of the close
corporation owner and the corporation itself, that may well be appropri-
ate in a pure Braswell type of setting. Braswell is the sole owner of a
small enterprise that he alone manages and operates. In this setting there
is de jure, but not de facto, separateness between Braswell and his corpo-
ration. Thus, to fine Braswell and his corporation for the same offense is
equivalent to fining him twice. The second punishment could be re-
garded as a penalty for doing business in corporate form. The offset
guideline ameliorates the potential harshness of this result by giving
Braswell credit for the fine he paid in his own name.
But how does this play outside the context of Braswell's solely owned
corporation? Suppose there are five owners-Mr. and Mrs. Braswell,
Mr. Braswell's mother, Mr. Braswell's long-time business associate, and
the business associate's Aunt Tillie-each of whom owns a twenty per-
ment privilege against self-incrimination to escape producing corporate books and records subpoe-
naed by grand jury. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115-19.
49. If Braswell is the price fixer, however, the corporate shield will not insulate him from per-
sonal liability. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962); O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 12,
§ 1.11. Under some circumstances, however, the corporation is permitted to indemnify him for the
fine assessed against him in his individual capacity. See supra note 44.
50. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.09, at 38.
51. See supra note 49.
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cent interest. Braswell and his long-time associate co-manage the busi-
ness. Braswell's wife, the secretary treasurer, is responsible for corporate
financial affairs. His mother, as vice president, is in charge of marketing.
Aunt Tillie, who acquired her stock as a gift from her nephew, has never
had an active role in the corporation's management. All five owners are
compensated in the form of salaries, bonuses, dividends or the like.
Braswell becomes ambitious. Anxious for the corporation to win a
lucrative government contract, he arranges a large bank loan to the cor-
poration. To convince the bank that the corporation is creditworthy, he
falsifies the corporation's financial statement to report inflated inven-
tories. He also misrepresents the purpose of the loan as "need to expand
inventory due to anticipated increased demand." In reality, he will use
the loan proceeds to bribe a public official to obtain the government
contract.
At the time when this transpires, the remaining officer/managers are
experiencing a variety of other distractions. Braswell's wife changes her
status from part-time to full-time anesthesiologist at a local hospital, and
so attends her corporate financial responsibilities on weekends as time
permits. His mother is in a nursing home recuperating from hip surgery.
Every day or so she makes goodwill telephone calls to valued corporate
customers. The long-time business associate is in the midst of an acrimo-
nious divorce and has assumed a more active role in the care of his chil-
dren. Aunt Tillie, of course, is blissfully remote from all of this muddle.
The net result is that none of the other owners noticed that Braswell
procured a fraudulent corporate loan, whose proceeds were paid as graft
to secure the contract. But it is safe to assume that all of them noticed
the corporation's enhanced profitability under the contract.
Here the case for offset is less than overwhelming, and would be even
less so if responsibility for corporate operations were spread among ten,
fifteen, or thirty shareholders. In this scenario we lack the kind of iden-
tity between owner and organization that exists when Braswell conducts
his one man show. Responsibility for corporate operations is more dif-
fused, and one might reasonably conclude that there is both de jure and
de facto separateness between entity and owners.
What is achieved by disregarding that separateness and offsetting Bras-
well's fine against the corporate fine in this case?52 The offset does not
52. Although it is relatively rare for courts to "pierce the corporate veil" and permit an ag-
grieved third party to hold corporate manager/shareholders personally accountable, the law may
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reallocate the corporate fine among the five owners. It does not distin-
guish between Braswell, who has already paid a fine, and the four "inno-
cent owners" who have not. Thus, granting an offset here merely spreads
the credit for Braswell's fine equally among all five owners.
The focus of the remedy must have changed, then. By reducing the
government's claim against corporate assets that are equally owned by all
five owners, the driving concern is not so clearly to minimize unfairness
to Braswell. But if that is not it, what else could it be? A desire to give
Braswell a little relief because he has already been punished and to share
the relief with his co-owners because they have not been convicted? Are
his co-owners worthy of relief?
53
Assuming arguendo that we clear this hurdle and conclude that, at
least in principle, offset serves some as yet unarticulated useful goal in
disregard separateness if the corporation is used to promote illegal conduct. See generally Robert B.
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036 (1991).
"[S]ince the franchise is granted by the state for a useful and valid purpose, it may not be em-
ployed to further wrong. Where it is so employed the law will disregard the rule, go behind the
fiction, and treat the stockholders as if the corporation did not exist." Eichelberger v. Arlington
Bldg., Inc., 280 F. 997, 999 (App. D.C. 1922). Cf. FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564,
574-75 (7th Cir.) (principals of telemarketing firms individually liable for violating FTC Act where
they controlled firms, wrote or reviewed misleading telemarketing scripts, and were aware of high
volume of consumer complaints and credit card chargebacks), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989);
Hemphill-Kunstler-Buhler, Auctioneers & Appraisers v. Davis Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 516 So.
2d 402, 403-04 (La. App. 1987) (shareholder, officer or director may not be held liable for corporate
obligations except in case of fraud, malfeasance or criminal wrongdoing), cert. denied, 520 So. 2d
751 (La. 1988); J. L. Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 391 N.W.2d 110, 114-15 (Neb. 1986) (when
corporate entity is used to justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, law will regard corporation
as an association of persons); Nev-Tex Oil & Gas v. Precision Rolled Prods., 782 P.2d 1311, 1311
(Nev. 1989) (corporate agent's fraud on behalf of corporation subjects him to personal liability,
whether or not corporate veil could be pierced); Kaites v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 529 A.2d
1148, 1151 (Pa. Commw. 1987) (use of corporate form to perpetrate fraud may justify disregarding
corporate form).
Thus, courts may regard the shareholders as an association of individuals whose personal assets
are at risk. £ L Brock, 391 N.W.2d at 114-15. The remedy may both make the controlling share-
holder liable for corporate obligations and hold the corporation liable for the shareholders' delicts.
Estudios, Proyectos E Inversiones de Centro America, S.A. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 507 So. 2d 1119,
1120-21 (Fla. App. 1987) (corporation may be liable for shareholder's debts when shareholder fraud-
ulently used corporation to avoid preexisting personal liability).
The offset guideline turns this principle on its head, disregarding the owner's abuse of the privilege
of separateness. The offset amounts to piercing the corporate veil for a wrongdoer's benefit.
53. Braswell's crimes put money in the corporate coffers to the benefit of all five owners. The
other owners must share some of the blame for his wrongdoing, moreover. Braswell could not have
obtained the bank loan on the basis of his personal net worth statement. The corporation was instru-
mental to his crime. Although none of his co-owners actively participated in his delicts, their lax
oversight practices facilitated his misconduct.
Washington University Open Scholarship
204 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
this context, the mechanics of applying the guideline to corporations
with multiple owners pose another conundrum. Assume that Braswell
was fined $200,000 for his bank fraud and bribery. How much of his
personal fine may be offset against that of the corporation? The answer is
twenty percent-$40,000. The guideline achieves "appropriate punish-
ment" by allowing the court to reduce the corporate fine by a percentage
of Braswell's fine that reflects his percentage ownership interest in the
corporation.
But what relationship does that percentage bear to minimizing unfair-
ness to Braswell? To minimizing unfairness to the corporation? In what
sense does this quantum of relief achieve "appropriate punishment?" In
this context the offset guideline is, in truth, a very curious rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recognition of corporate criminal liability by the courts was an ac-
knowledgment of the growing power corporations have over commerce.
Corporate liability for crime provides a check on corporate power. This
core concern applies with equal force to close corporations, which consti-
tute an estimated ninety percent or more of incorporated organizations
and include within their ranks some of the largest business entities in the
country.
Although many small "mom and pop" operations like Braswell's con-
duct business as closely held corporations, their ownership structure is
not germane to the question whether their operations should be subject
to the rule of institutional criminal liability. What makes the "corporate-
ness" of these operations qualitatively different is not that they are pri-
vately held, but that they are small, uncomplicated organizations in
which the owners often actively manage the business. In these organiza-
tions, wrongdoers can be identified with relative ease because there is
little corporate bureaucracy or hierarchy to cloak their identities or
motives.
Whether these corporations should be governed by the institutional
liability rule is partly a function of the practical relationship between per-
sonal and institutional accountability, and partly of what (or whether) we
gain from demanding both. If we do demand both, it makes little sense
to disregard the institution's "corporateness" absent strong identity be-
tween the convicted owner/manager and the corporation itself.
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